Hume sobre prazer e valor e o desafio Kantiano by Klaudat, André
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC 
BY 4.0), which permits reproduction, adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited.
ABSTRACT
In this paper I examine Hume’s claims about the nature of moral sentiments (mainly in T 
3.1.2) using as a foil the Kantian challenge to all material practical principles: they are all 
of the same type, being based on self-love and making all choices, including moral ones, 
hedonically fungible. The paper explores Hume’s views on pleasure as constitutive of moral 
sentiment as an answer to that challenge arguing that for him only pleasure is essentially 
valuable for beings like us. It thus grounds a notion of value which, through a “progressive 
or dynamic” view of human nature, informs a conception of moral pleasure – a “taste in 
character traits” – as a distinctive type of pleasure that is not amenable to a mere quantita-
tive criterium to guide moral choice.
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RESUMO
Neste texto examino as teses de Hume sobre a natureza dos sentimentos morais usando 
como contraste o desafio kantiano a todos os princípios práticos materiais: que eles são 
todos de um mesmo tipo, baseados no amor de si e tornando todas as escolhas, inclusive as 
morais, fungíveis hedonicamente. Exploro a posição de Hume quanto ao prazer ser consti-
tutivo do sentimento moral como uma resposta àquele desafio argumentando que para ele 
somente o prazer é essencialmente valioso para seres como nós. Essa posição fundamenta 
uma noção de valor que através de uma visão “progressiva ou dinâmica” da natureza hu-
mana informa uma concepção de prazer moral – um “gosto em traços de caráter”- como 
um tipo distinto de prazer que não está sujeito ao um critério meramente quantitativo para 
guiar a escolha moral.
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For reflexivity to yield normative outcomes, 
what is turned inward has to be itself by its 
nature evaluative, having the good – not 
merely the true – as its proper object (Baier, 
1995, p. 29).
Introduction
After putting the problem concerning the founda-
tion of morality in his technical terms – whether it is by 
means of ideas or impressions, tertium non datur, that we 
distinguish between virtue and vice (cf. Hume, 1978, 
p. 456) – Hume seeks to prove, in T 3.1.1., negatively: “Mor-
al distinctions not deriv’d from reason”. Hume enjoys himself 
pursuing this part of his argument. If we take into account 
that its positive part – the second section, which aims to 
show: “Moral distinctions deriv’d from a moral sense” – is 
architectonically based on the negative result and on the 
view that the alternatives are exclusive and exhaustive, we 
could well find ourselves asking: does Hume consider the 
negative part the strongest (14 pages) or the positive part 
the weakest (practically 6 pages)?
Hume commences in T 3.1.2. the constructive part of 
his view, and presents the task thus: “The next question is, of 
what nature are these impressions, and after what manner do 
they operate upon us?” (Hume, 1978, p. 470).
What is  ecially striking is Hume’s decisive attitude 
at first; but then, as a break in the push forwards, we get the 
circum ect development of the approach, as if the subject 
required it. Here we have Hume’s main thesis:
Here we cannot remain long in suspense, 
but must pronounce the impression aris-
ing from virtue to be agreeable, and that 
proceeding from vice to be uneasy (Hume, 
1978, p. 470).
This thesis concerns the positive and negative hedonic char-
a ers of our “impressions” of the objects of moral assessment. 
However, when Hume “has to be” more  ecific about the na-
ture of these impressions, he deliberately uses phrases – in one 
paragraph (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 471), the same phrase four times 
(“particular”, once in italics) – which are general, un ecific2. The 
impressions in question “are nothing but particular pains or plea-
sures”. The view of an a ion, or a sentiment, or a chara er, as 
virtuous or vicious is due to the fact that it “causes a pleasure or 
uneasiness of a particular kind”. And “to have the sense of virtue, 
is nothing but to feel a satisfa ion of a particular kind from the 
contemplation of a chara er” in an agent. And “in feeling that [a 
chara er] pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel 
that it is virtuous”. 
In fact, in the sequel Hume (1978) continues to use 
terms that are not  ecific: “a satisfa ion or uneasiness” 
(p. 471); “of that peculiar kind” (p. 472); “a particular kind of 
pleasure” (p. 472). 
Hume himself, then, presents an objection to his argu-
ment which is structurally the same as the objection he had used 
against the rationalist position in the previous section: isn’t it 
the case that “any object, whether animate or inanimate, ratio-
nal or irrational, might become morally good or evil, provided 
it can excite a satisfa ion or uneasiness” (Hume, 1978, p. 471)? 
Hume’s answer to it comprises two observations. The first helps 
us a bit with the explanation of the nature of “moral pleasure and 
uneasiness”; the second seems to involve a petitio principii. These 
observations, however, allow us to see where the difficulties lie in 
relation to the positive part of Hume’s argument.
The first observation (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 472) reminds 
us that the term “pleasure” is in fact used, and in this Hume 
may mislead us (as if the issue concerned the brute phenome-
nology of sensations), to refer to many “sensations” which are 
different among themselves. Good music and a good wine are 
not going to be mixed up with virtue (I mean, the pleasure 
they provide). And a man who has “temper and judgment” 
can accept, in an example which fits the discussion better, 
that an enemy of his has got a beautiful voice. What we have 
up to this point are, however, only comparisons.
The second observation (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 473) still 
aims to distinguish what is peculiar about “moral pleasure or 
uneasiness”. As virtue and vice are in us or in others, they are 
features of human chara er, and as they excite a pleasure or 
pain, we can expect – from these two “circumstances” – that 
virtue and vice “must give rise to one of [the] four [indirect] 
passions” (Hume, 1978, p. 473). And we should bear in mind 
the purpose of this observation: “which clearly distinguishes 
[virtue and vice] from the pleasure and pain arising from in-
animate objects” (Hume, 1978, p. 473).
However, if we want to explain the  ecific hedonic na-
ture of “moral pleasure and pain” with the fact that we feel 
pride or humility, love or hatred, with our virtues or vices 
or with those of others – that is, using the fact that the in-
direct passions can also have as their causes moral features 
– then, it seems, we should not suppose, as Hume does, the 
“circumstance” that virtue and vice excite pleasure and pain 
independently, which is what enables them to be such a causal 
factor. Because it was precisely this circumstance that Hume 
was out to explain in the first place, including with the pres-
ent reminder of a such well-known fact.
The Kantian Challenge
Kant argues against sentiments in at least two of the 
three main roles, which he discusses, they could play in mo-
2 Pace: “Moral impressions, then, are feelings partly analogous to sense impressions. And Hume is fairly explicit about what sorts of 
feelings they are. […] They differ from other pleasures and pains in their phenomenological quality (they are […] qualitatively different 
from the pleasures of wine and music), and also in virtue of two causal characteristics they have” (Cohon, 2008, p. 105).
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rality. The first is their distinguishing role. We would use sen-
timents to mark, in the philosophical phrase Kant uses, “the 
 ecific difference between virtue and vice” (cf. Kant, 2002, 
p. 442). Kant argues this somewhat impatiently and with 
some contempt (perhaps with Hutcheson in mind):
[…] moral feeling, this alleged special 
sense, however shallow be the appeal to 
it, when people who are unable to think 
hope to help themselves out by feeling, 
even when the question is solely one of 
universal law, and however little feelings, 
differing as they naturally do from one an-
other by an infinity of degrees, can supply 
a uniform measure of good and evil – let 
alone the fact that one person by his feel-
ing can make no valid judgements at all for 
others – moral feeling still remains closer to 
morality and to its dignity in this respect: it 
does virtue the honour of ascribing to her 
directly the approval and esteem in which 
she is held, and does not, as it were, tell her 
to her face that we are attached to her, not 
for her beauty, but only for our own advan-
tage (Kant, 2002, p. 442-443).
It is quite interesting to notice that Hume, in turn, 
stresses this  ecific role of sentiments, and is clearly intent on 
making a lot out of it. Hume aims to avoid the threat to mo-
rality that is similar to a false taste in aesthetic appreciation. 
In section 8, “Of the sources of allegiance” (part 2, “Of Justice”, 
of Book 3), Hume has three distinct worries about morality. 
One is philosophical concerning the origin of moral obligation 
(cf. Hume, 1978, p. 546-547), another is the worry about de-
grees of virtue and vice in the sentiments and chara ers of 
agents. In relation to the latter, Hume commits himself, in a 
typical empiricist fashion, to a  ecific epistemological con-
viction: at the basis of this process of attesting the degrees 
of virtue and vice is the reliable operation of our sensibility. 
Hume states that what is decisive is that we feel pleasure or 
pain in the contemplation of people’s sentiments and char-
a ers, and this pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the 
person who feels them (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 457). This strong 
epistemological thesis licenses the claim that there will be as 
much reality in virtues and vices of a person’s sentiments and 
chara er as there is pleasure and pain in a  ectator’s contem-
plation, and there is no possibility of a mistake in this regard. 
Thus Hume says: “[…] there is just so much vice or virtue in 
any chara er as every one places in it, and that it is impossi-
ble in this particular we can ever be mistaken” (Hume, 1978, 
p. 457). I will come back to this text later on.
However, as to the objectivity of moral distinctions based 
on sentiments – how they work as ways of distinguishing mor-
al features –, Hume is certainly more optimistic than Kant. 
We can see this in the footnote he puts on the point:
This proposition [that there is just so much 
vice or virtue in any character as every one 
places in it, and that it is impossible in this 
particular we can ever be mistaken] must 
hold strictly true with regard to every quality 
that is determined merely by sentiment. In 
what sense we can talk either of a right or a 
wrong taste in morals, eloquence, or beau-
ty, shall be considered afterwards. In the 
meantime it may be observed, that there is 
such uniformity in the general sentiments of 
mankind, as to render such questions of but 
small importance (Hume, 1978, p. 547n).
The second role of sentiments Kant discusses in relation 
to morality is crucial for my purposes. This is the justificatory 
role. We are dealing here with what from Kant’s point of view 
is essential to morality, i.e., laws which have the feature of “ab-
solute necessity” – being just for this reason morally valid (cf. 
Kant, 2002, p. 389). What is needed for our full understanding 
of the nature of morality is that we have available a satisfacto-
ry philosophical explanation of “the ground of obligation” (cf. 
Kant, 2002, p. 389). (This is also what is at issue in Hume’s iden-
tification of the philosophical worry with the sources of moral 
obligation, as we saw above.) For Kant, what is essential to mo-
rality is a principle that appears to us necessary as a “categorical 
imperative”. It is with regard to the justification of this principle 
that sentiments have no role whatsoever. The following is a 
text where this point is made quite clearly.
If we really intend to arrive at this proof [the 
a priori proof of the categorical imperative] 
it is extremely important to remember that 
we should not let ourselves think for a mo-
ment that the reality of this principle can be 
derived from the particular characteristics 
of human nature. For duty has to be a prac-
tical, unconditional necessity of action; it 
must therefore hold for all rational beings 
(to whom alone an imperative can apply 
at all), and only for that reason a law that 
holds also for all human wills. Whatever, on 
the other hand, is derived from the special 
predisposition of humanity, from certain 
feelings and propensities, and even, if this 
is possible, from some special bent peculiar 
to human reason and not holding necessari-
ly for the will of every rational being – all this 
can indeed supply a personal maxim, but 
not a law: it can give us a subjective princi-
ple – one on which we have a natural predis-
position and inclination to act – but not an 
objective principle on which we should be 
directed to act even though our every pro-
pensity, inclination, and natural bent were 
opposed to it (Kant, 2002, p. 425).
The third role of sentiments in relation to morality in 
Kant’s thinking will be briefly mentioned only for the sake of 
the whole picture. It is much less negative. For Kant, we are 
natural rational animals in relation to which it does not make 
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sense to seek to get rid of our sensibility. However, its correct 
relation to morality has a necessary effect, because  ecifiable a 
priori, which is the Kantian moral sentiment, i.e., re ect, this 
sui generis sentiment produced rationally by concepts. Kant’s 
conception of this sentiment is based on his view that there 
is in us an undeniable natural self-love, which has to be dis-
ciplined in the form of a rational self-love; and on his view 
that there is a natural progression of this form of love, which 
is censurable when not morally disciplined, towards moral ar-
rogance, an attitude which in turn must be wholly annulated, 
because it is in principle incompatible with the categorical 
imperative3. I should still mention the four natural predispo-
sitions, which we can know are necessarily in us (their con-
sciousness is not of empirical origin), that are at the basis of 
morality and are the subjective conditions for the receptivity 
of the concept of duty (featured for the first time as such in 
the late Metaphysics of Morals). They are the moral sentiment, 
conscience, love for other human beings and re ect (cf. Kant, 
1996b, p. 399-404). But let us now return to Kant’s criticism 
of the view that sentiments could have a role in the justifica-
tion of morality, which involves what I claim is a challenge to 
a position such as Hume’s.
The Kantian challenge to Hume’s position is to be found 
in the first two theorems and their proofs in the Critique 
of Pra ical Reason. The first theorem states that a will – as 
Hume seems to conceive of it – is inevitably always deter-
mined empirically, never satisfying the desideratum of qualify-
ing for a pure will. Theorem 1 reads:
All practical principles that presuppose an 
object (matter) of the faculty of desire as the 
determining ground of the will are, without 
exception, empirical and can furnish no 
practical laws (Kant, 1996a, p. 21).
Theorem 2 puts in abstract terms what the problem is 
with all empirical or material principles which are geared to-
wards the matter of the faculty of desire, i.e., its connection 
with the principle of pleasure as the rationale for the determi-
nation of choice. Theorem 2 reads:
All material practical principles as such are, 
without exception, of one and the same 
kind and come under the general principle 
of self-love or one’s own happiness (Kant, 
1996a, p. 22).
Let us look closer at Kant’s conception of an empirically 
determined will. Two issues need to be taken into account in 
order to grasp Kant’s argument against sentiments playing a 
role in the justification of morality.
In the first place, the proof of theorem 2 (cf. Kant, 
1996a, p. 22) e ablishes a connection between the principle 
of human natural happiness and pleasure in such a way that 
the account of all empirical pra ical principles as of “one and 
the same type” follows, that is, all of them are hedonically 
oriented. Human natural happiness is understood as the con-
sciousness of an agreeableness of states in life that accompa-
nies uninterruptedly the whole of a being’s existence (p. 22.). 
And someone who makes this happiness her pra ical princi-
ple guiding her choices is in fact orienting herself exclusively 
by happiness as her only value. This involves a  ecific type of 
determination of the faculty of desire, i.e., the expectation of 
pleasure with the existence of an object determines the de-
sire for it because of the receptivity of the subject in relation 
to the object – receptivity because pleasure depends on the 
affection of our sensibility by an object. For this reason ma-
terial pra ical principles, which are geared towards “existing” 
objects of the faculty of desire, can only determine it through 
its receptivity, through the desire guided by the expectation 
of pleasure.
In the second place, Remark 1 to the Corollary of 
the theorem in question (cf. Kant, 1996a, p. 22-25) makes 
explicit that pleasure is exclusively the principle of choice 
when we choose in view of the empirical objects of the fac-
ulty of desire. Kant begins by pointing out the mistake of 
trying to keep apart a lower faculty of desire and a superior 
faculty of desire by distinguishing the origin of the repre-
sentation of the object which will offer us pleasure, tradi-
tionally, the senses and the understanding re ectively. It is a 
mistake because if what is of interest is the pleasure (the sat-
isfa ion) we will get with the object, then it does not mat-
ter wherefrom we get the representation of it, whether from 
the senses or the understanding. For Kant, the crucial point 
is the “determining ground of the will”. It does not matter 
from which faculty the representation of the object comes 
as long as the representation has its role in leading to a ion 
by presupposing “a feeling of pleasure in the subject”. The 
representation’s capacity to have the pra ical effect that is 
a ion depends exclusively on the receptivity of the subject, 
of her being “agreeably affected by the representation”.
However dissimilar ideas of objects may be, 
though they be ideas of the understanding, 
or even of the reason in contrast to ideas of 
sense, yet the feeling of pleasure, by means 
of which they constitute the determining 
principle of the will (the expected satisfac-
tion which impels the activity to the produc-
tion of the object) is of one and the same 
kind, not only inasmuch as it can be only 
known empirically, but also inasmuch as it 
affects one and the same vital force which 
manifests itself in the faculty of desire, and 
in this respect can only differ in degree from 
every other ground of determination. Oth-
erwise, how could we compare in respect of 
3 Cf. Kant (1996a, chapter III): “On the Incentives of Pure Practical Reason”.
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magnitude two principles of determination, 
the ideas of which depend upon different 
faculties, so as to prefer that which affects 
the faculty of desire in the highest degree? 
(Kant, 1996a, p. 23).
The argument is as follows: if we, when deciding or 
choosing, look for whatever material object in our search for 
pleasure (existent or that will exist as a consequence of our 
a ion), then, (1) we can not cognize, except empirically, a 
posteriori, whether the object in question will provide us the 
gratification sought; and (2), concerning the principle deter-
mining the choice among objects, we can not have any other 
criterium except the quantity of gratification we expect.
Kant presents his examples of choosing of lesser goods 
in place of greater goods to e ablish his point (a text which 
reminds us of Hume’s famous examples, used for quite differ-
ent purposes).
The same human being may return unread 
an instructive book which he cannot again 
obtain, in order not to miss a hunt; he may 
depart in the midst of a fine speech, in or-
der not to be late for dinner; he may leave a 
rational conversation, such as he otherwise 
values highly, to take his place at the gam-
ing-table; he may even repulse a poor man 
whom he at other times takes pleasure in 
benefiting, because he has only just enough 
money in his pocket to pay for his admission 
to the theatre (Kant, 1996a, p. 23).
The fact that in all these cases it is the same human be-
ing certainly shows that one option in each pair of possibilities 
is not justified. But Kant aims to illustrate what a mistaken 
pra ical orientation makes inevitable: hedonism. Realistically, 
these cases happen, but if human beings only choose because of 
the expected pleasure from the satisfa ion of their desire, then 
the only criterium for choice is the amount of pleasure with the 
choice made. If the basis of choice is the pleasure sought, then 
the source of the representation of the object does not matter. 
“The only thing that concerns him, in order to decide upon a 
choice, is how intense, how long, how easily acquired, and of-
ten repeated this agreeableness is” (Kant, 1996a, p. 23). Kant’s 
argument, then, is simply: if the principle of the determination 
of the faculty of desire is empirical, then the consequence will 
be the undesirable inevitableness of a hedonism of choice, that 
is, the fungibility of all forms of pleasure4.
It is important to note the rationale for this argument. It is 
clear that Kant aims to show that sentiments can not be a source 
of objetive values5. However we should be clear about the nature 
of the Kantian argument against giving to sentiments any role to 
play in the justification of morality. According to Kant, the prob-
lem with empirical pra ical principles is not that they are forms 
of egoism, or the seeking of satisfa ion as such (self-love), also 
not the egoism which seeks advantages in all choices; rather, the 
problem is trying to make the search for satisfa ion, self-love, a 
pra ical law, that is, aiming to do it, because this cannot be done, 
given that empirical pra ical principles can not rid themselves of 
a condition of self-reference in value: what is of value for me ends 
up just being what is of value to me (Cf. Herman, 2005, p. 24). 
As Barbara Herman says: “[...] whatever principle one makes the 
supreme for one’s choice marks what one takes to be of highest 
value. If an agent who desires happiness makes the principle of 
happiness her supreme determining ground of choice, it is a mark 
not just of self-love, but of self-conceit. Her first value in a ion 
is then her own pursuit of her own happiness” (2005, p. 24). It is 
impossible for these pra ical principles to be objective pra ical 
principles – they cannot contain objective value (which is not 
relative to the subject who values). The Kantian challenge, then, 
is the following: without objective value all we can have is a he-
donism of choice, which is unacceptable. 
However, it is also important to note that the Kantian 
challenge need not be accepted in Kant’s own terms. In fact, 
I will claim that Hume has much to say about this difficulty 
from his own philosophical per ective.
Hume on the Nature of the 
Moral Sentiment
The central question of T 3.1.1. – whether it is by means 
of our impressions or our ideas that we make “moral distinc-
tions” – seems to be an epistemological question. This would be 
borne out by Hume’s claims: (i) “[...] since vice and virtue are 
not discoverable merely by reason [...] it must be by means of 
some impression or sentiment they occasion that we are able 
to mark the difference betwixt them” (Hume, 1978, p. 470). 
(ii) “Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judg’d of ” 
(Hume, 1978, p. 470). (iii) “Now since the distinguishing im-
pressions, by which moral good or evil is known, are nothing 
but [...]” (Hume, 1978, p. 471). (iv) “We do not infer a char-
a er to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it 
pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it 
is virtuous” (Hume, 1978, p. 471).
4 Cf.: “[…] Kant is […] clearly aware in the central argument of the second Critique that unless there is a source of value separate from 
our subjective receptivity, we will be left with no better account of rational agency and choice than that offered by hedonism, and that 
is no account of rational agency at all” (Herman, 2005, p. 30).
5 Cf. Herman (2005, p. 31). Cf. also: “The threat is that in the absence of access to objective values, or values derived from some other 
authoritative source, hedonism is the true theory of motivation and choice” (Herman, 2007, p. 177); and: “[Kant] may have had some-
thing else in mind […]: namely, to use the unpalatable consequences of a hedonism of choice to show the limits of empirical practical 
reason (i.e., the principle of self-love) as a fundamental principle of will, even in its own domain of nonmoral choice” (Herman, 2007, 
p. 189).
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However, I think that something more important than 
that comes across in these statements by Hume, and it bears 
on the nature of the “impressions” by means of which we 
make the moral distinctions6. In my view, Hume at this point 
commits himself to a conception of the source of moral value. 
What experience allows us to see is what is at the basis of mo-
rality. Let us return to the point with which we began. Con-
cerning the nature of moral sentiment we saw Hume stating:
[...] Of what nature are these impressions 
[...]? Here we cannot remain long in sus-
pense, but must pronounce the impression 
arising from virtue to be agreeable, and that 
proceeding from vice to be uneasy. Every 
moment’s experience must convince us of 
this (Hume, 1978, p. 470).
What Hume claims that experience shows us is the basis 
of value for us, or what constitutes value for us and lies at the 
basis of morality: pleasure and pain7. Hume makes this point 
clearly in the following passage:
Nor need any one wonder, that though I 
have all along endeavoured to establish my 
system on pure reason, and have scarce ever 
cited the judgment even of philosophers or 
historians on any article, I should now ap-
peal to popular authority, and oppose the 
sentiments of the rabble to any philosophi-
cal reasoning. For it must be observed, that 
the opinions of men, in this case, carry with 
them a peculiar authority, and are, in a great 
measure, infallible. The distinction of moral 
good and evil is founded on the pleasure or 
pain which results from the view of any sen-
timent or character; and, as that pleasure or 
pain cannot be unknown to the person who 
feels it, it follows, that there is just so much 
vice or virtue in any character as every one 
places in it, and that it is impossible in this 
particular we can ever be mistaken. And, 
though our judgments concerning the ori-
gin of any vice or virtue, be not so certain as 
those concerning their degrees, yet, since 
the question in this case regards not any 
philosophical origin of an obligation, but 
a plain matter of fact, it is not easily con-
ceived how we can fall into an error (Hume, 
1978, p. 546-547).
This passage makes two points: (1) The opinions of 
men, which have a peculiar authority when it comes to mo-
rality and which are “in a great measure infallible”, allow us to 
state what the source of morality is: “The distinction of moral 
good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain which results 
from the view of any sentiment or chara er” (Hume, 1978, 
p. 546, my emphasis). (2) As this pleasure or pain cannot be 
unknown to the person who feels it, “there is just so much 
vice or virtue in any chara er as every one places in it, and 
that it is impossible in this particular we can ever be mistak-
en”. This second point expresses Hume’s epistemological con-
viction, which I mentioned above apropos Kant on the role of 
sentiments in morality. But, as a consequence, the first point 
must be about the nature of moral good and evil, about what 
according to Hume constitutes them fundamentally, about 
what is at their basis so as make them of value.
When Hume has to deal with the nature of moral sen-
timent, the orientation of his thinking regarding the concep-
tion of value comes out at least in its main features, so that this 
conception allows him a particular view of the origin of mo-
rality. First, Hume quite clearly refuses “the question of human 
nature”, he refuses to contemplate the excluding options that 
human beings are by nature either virtuous or vicious and that 
we could determine this by a  ecial gift of detection (Cf. Gill, 
2006, p. 203-205). In the section in question, in answer to the 
question “From what principles is it [this pain or pleasure] derived, 
and whence does it arise in the human mind?”, Hume claims that it 
is absurd to think that in each particular case the (NB) “senti-
ments” should be produced by “an original quality and primary 
constitution”. This is a clear refusal of a moral innatism: there are 
not “original” instincts enough for the number and complexity 
of our moral duties (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 473).
Second, concerning the possibility that the principles 
have their origin in nature, or that they have another origin, 
Hume refuses a natural law position that equates what is 
moral with what is natural and what is immoral with what 
is unnatural (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 473-476). In this re ect, 
Hume’s position is not that morality comes to life ready-made 
from “original” principles of human nature, as is claimed by 
both rationalists, on the one side, and by moral sentimental-
ists, on the other. Rather, Hume claims that it springs from 
our intera ions with one another and with the empirical 
world, and therefore depends on the features of our make-up 
and on our situations in the world (Cf. Gill, 2006, p. 214-225). 
This implies a view of human nature which Michael Gill calls 
“progressive or dynamic”, whereas Hume’s predecessors held a 
6 Pace: “Treatise Book 3, Part 1, is best read as an epistemology of value: an account of how we become aware of the moral properties, 
rather than an account of the semantic status of moral judgement [NB: perhaps this contrast attenuates my point]. The moral sensing 
view is an interpretation of this moral epistemology” (Cohon, 2008, p. 101-102). However, Cohon’s main point is that “the moral sensing 
interpretation [holds] that for Hume our basic awareness of vice and virtue is a direct apprehension by feeling. In the standard case, we 
grasp good and evil directly, by experiencing the sentiments of approval and disapproval” (2008, p. 103).
7 Rachel Cohon comes closer to my type of worry when she says that “as for their nature [virtuousness and viciousness], that is not specified. 
We feel them and form beliefs about whatever properties feel that way, but what they are in themselves is not spelled out. But this is too quick. 
[…] Hume has inter alia made commitments in places to some claims about the nature of good and evil” (Cohon, 2008, p. 113). But then the 
list is admittedly negative, saying what moral properties are not, and then Cohon goes back to her epistemological interests.
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view which was “static” (Cf. Gill, 2006, p. 227). This dynamic 
per ective is also noticeable in Hume’s claim about the pecu-
liarity of moral sentiment which shows up in its  ecial effect: 
the indirect passions. Let’s go back to this issue.
At the beginning of the paper, I presented a difficulty with 
Hume’s reasoning about this, a petitio in his claim that this fact 
could help clarifying the peculiarity of the moral sentiments. 
Seeing Hume’s account as dynamic allows us to solve the prob-
lem. As long as Hume can use our experience (the first-person 
one) that pride and humility with our chara ers, or our moral 
qualities, and love and hatred with that of others can have  ecif-
ic causes (technically  eaking: Hume’s understanding of “cause” 
here, so that the point  point does not concern the phenomenol-
ogy of the passions, but rather their intentionality), then he can 
claim, in view of his theory of the double relation of impressions 
and ideas in the explanation of the origin of the indirect passions, 
that this effect of virtues and vices requires the independent and, 
in this regard, proper hedonic chara er of the moral sentiment 
(which constitutes the awareness of virtue and vice; in fact, the 
mechanism gets started by the satisfa ion with virtue and the 
dissatisfa ion with vice): a form of pleasure or pain entertained 
in the contemplation of our chara er or that of others. In this 
way, the associationistic dynamics dissolves the difficulty when 
Hume appeals to this causal phenomenon. And we should not 
play down the importance Hume gives to this: “And this is, per-
haps, the most considerable effect that virtue and vice have upon 
the human mind” (Hume, 1978, p. 473). That is: rather than the 
effect being an expected normative one at first, it is rather simply 
the occurrence of certain passions, in part as a consequence of the 
hedonic chara er of the “cause” of pride or humility in this case.
But the dynamic or progressive per ective can also help 
us with the appreciation of what in Hume lies at the basis of 
value in morality.
The Rationale for Moral Value in Hume
There are many cases which prove the appeal to a dy-
namic per ective in Hume’s analyses in the Treatise. I will 
consider one which will lead me to the core of Hume’s view 
on value. I will describe the beginnings of Hume’s argumenta-
tion aiming to e ablish the “first law of nature” that concerns 
justice, i.e. the convention about the stability of possession.
Human beings are the most dependent animals, they are 
needy but helpless. We need clothes and dwellings to protect 
ourselves against the weather (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 484-485). As 
individuals, we are (1) too weak to do any considerable work by 
ourselves; (2) unable to improve our abilities to considerable lev-
els; and (3) destined to “inevitable ruin and misery”.
Society is the only solution to these “inconveniences”. 
It is the remedy for these “defects”. “By the conjunction of 
forces, our power is augmented: By the partition of employ-
ments, our ability encreases: And by mutual succour we are 
less expos’d to fortune and accidents. ’Tis by this additional 
force, ability and security, that society becomes advantageous” 
(Hume, 1978, p. 485).
However, these considerations are excessively  ecula-
tive and made ex post facto. 
But, in order to form society, it is requisite 
not only that it be advantageous, but also 
that men be sensible of these advantages; 
and it is impossible, in their wild unculti-
vated state, that by study and reflection 
alone they should ever be able to attain this 
knowledge (Hume, 1978, p. 486).
What saves us is one of our natural necessities: sexual 
desire or the “natural appetite betwixt the sexes”. This is “the 
first and original principle of human society”. It is clear that it 
has this beneficent effect not because of its productive char-
a er. What happens is that the desire which unites man and 
woman is reliable enough to the point where “a new tye takes 
place in their concern for their common offspring”. This is the 
“natural affection” towards their children, which in turn, be-
ing developed and nurtured, gets to the point of becoming a 
“custom and habit” which “operat[es] on the tender minds of 
the children”. This is what “makes them sensible of the advan-
tages, which they may reap from society, as well as fashions 
them by degrees for it, by rubbing off those rough corners and 
untoward affections, which prevent their coalition” (Hume, 
1978, p. 486). 
What happens in the sequel in this natural history of 
human society is that a “contrariety of passions” develops, a 
true “opposition of passions”. With regard to our “natural tem-
per”, the important point is not that we are egoists, but rather 
that our generosity is limited and partial. We are generous 
first and mainly to our family and friends. As Annette Baier 
helped us to appreciate, Hume is here again at his cheekiest 
(Cf. Baier, 1991, p. 200): “But though this generosity must be 
acknowledged to the honour of human nature, we may at the 
same time remark, that so noble an affection, instead of fitting 
men for large societies, is almost as contrary to them as the 
most narrow selfishness” (Hume, 1978, p. 487). 
What saves us at this stage of development are our “out-
ward circumstances”. There is a type of good for us, i.e., those 
“things” (Hume calls them the “external goods”) that we may 
acquire by “our industry and good fortune” which have the fea-
tures of (1) being an unstable possession, without suffering any 
alterations or losses by their mere easy transfer, and (2) being 
scarce in view of our needs and desires. But how can this help us?
It is not by appeal to “our natural uncultivated ideas of 
morality” (Hume, 1978, p. 489). What happens with these 
is that they rather “conform themselves to that partiality [of 
our affections], and give it an additional force and influence” 
(Hume, 1978, p. 489). These ideas simply follow “the natural 
and usual force of those several affections, which are directed 
towards [others]”. “[...] As every immorality is derived from 
some defect or unsoundness of the passions, and as this defect 
must be judged of, in a great measure, from the ordinary course of 
nature in the constitution of the mind” (Hume, 1978, p. 488), in 
this regard (in this area of our “natural familiar relations”) we nat-
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urally follow this partiality. So, there is a natural partiality in our 
affections which has an influence on “our ideas of vice and virtue” 
in this area. The consequence is that we judge unacceptable what 
does not conform to the “ordinary course of nature” either by 
excessive partiality or by detached impartiality. We blame indi-
viduals who are too partial towards their family and who are too 
welcoming to a “mere chance acquaintance”. Therefore, these can 
not be the ideas that could help us with the problem of correcting 
the natural partiality of our passions. The solution is something 
that is the product of “judgement and understanding” with re-
gard to those “external goods”: an “artifice”, a “convention” aiming 
“to be ow stability on the possession of [them]”. 
So, we should pay careful attention to what is the nature 
of the “contrariety”, the “opposition” of passions that is solved 
by the convention which gives stability to possession. Giv-
en their scarcity and the instability of their possession, our 
passions in regard to them enter in conflict with our newly 
developed “new affection” for society when we become sensi-
ble of its advantage, an affection which gets at this point fully 
expressed in our appreciation of “company and conversation”. 
The fact is that our generosity (of the naturally limited type) 
with relation to the “external goods” is what militates against 
the newly developing “affection” for society. 
However, this natural hum[e]an history, which we are 
inclined to think is so plausible, is ultimately based on what? 
Why is it that the minds of children are so sensible to the ad-
vantages of society?
We have seen that Hume refuses, in the second section, 
some sort of moral innatist naturalism, the position that we are 
formed by nature with some “original quality”, as for example “the 
love of mankind, merely as such”, a kind of universal love for hu-
man beings merely as such (cf. Hume, 1978, p. 481)8, mentioned at 
the beginning of his treatment of justice. Against such a position, 
Hume (1) claims, quite realistically, that such passion is not to be 
found in the human mind; and with this he (2) reveals an axio-
logical commitment: this “universal affection to mankind” would 
be, unbelievably, “independent of personal qualities, of services, 
or of relations to ourself ” (Hume, 1978, p. 481). 
The latter point is crucial to my claim. Hume is not 
only realistic, but he also bases the moral value of benefi-
cence on the interchanges of services or facilities which crys-
tallize in personal qualities. Hume hereby positions himself 
against the Kantian point about the constitutive limitation 
of empirical or material conceptions of value, the condition 
of self-reference, which makes what has value in relation 
to me into what is of value for me. Hume clearly commits 
himself to the inevitable self-reference of value, which is not 
deemed damaging to its satisfactory conception. But why 
exactly, what is the rationale for the point that the “love” for 
others depends on services, on the relations, to us? 
In my view this can be found in what has been dubbed 
a metaphysical hedonism by Peter Kail (2007, chapter 8)9. This 
is the view that only pleasure is essentially valuable and only 
pain is essentially worthy of aversion (cf. p. 177). This view 
is quite distinct from a psychological hedonism, which is the 
position that all our a ions are motivated by the desire for 
a future pleasure of the agent (cf. p. 179). Accordingly, meta-
physical hedonism is not a thesis about what is in fact desired 
or not (pleasure, for example, with the emphasis being on the 
explanation of a ion), but is a thesis about what is essentially 
of value and is because of it desirable on its own, that is, it is a 
thesis about what deserves to be desired or avoided (cf. p. 183). 
This position is sensibilist, for our conception about val-
ue arises from our familiarity with our impressions of pleasure 
and pain, which are for us essentially valuable and non-valu-
able re ectively. According to Kail, this position is realist, if 
only “in a very limited sense”, about (N.B.) what is essential 
value. “There are states that are desirable or aversion-worthy, 
albeit states of consciousness” (2007, p. 183)10.
A crucial evidence for ascribing to Hume this metaphys-
ical hedonism is his argument in Appendix 1 of the Enquiry 
concerning the Principles of Morals. Hume appeals to pleasure 
and pain to put a stop to a regress of justifications in a case of 
pra ical reasoning (cf. Hume, 1975, p. 293). Why does some-
one exercise? To keep healthy and so to avoid illness, which 
is painful. Why does he hate pain? It is not possible to give a 
reason for this. Or someone is trying to keep healthy so as to 
be able to work, to get money, to have pleasures. Why? Again, 
there cannot be a reason for this. 
It is impossible there can be a progress in in-
finitum, and that one thing can always be a 
reason, why another is desired. Something 
must be desirable on its own account, and 
because of its immediate accord or agree-
ment with human sentiment and affection 
(Hume, 1975, p. 293).
8 Cf. Hume (1978, p. 619) for Hume’s point that his system of sympathy only has advantages over other naturalist innatist systems (es-
pecially Hutcheson’s).
9 Kail (2007, chapter 8): “The Gold: Good, Evil, Belief and Desire”.
10 This feature seems to me to be compatible with Cohon’s anti-realist view of Hume’s position, given that a moral realist would hold, 
according to her, that “ethical properties (such as good and evil, virtue and vice, or right and wrong) exist independently of human psy-
chological reactions to the entities (such as people and actions) that are thought to bear these properties” (p. 99). According to Cohon, 
Hume’s is a “moral sensing view”: “moral properties are emotion-dependent [they are ‘reaction-dependent’], yet we can think and talk 
about them in a perfectly sensible way [in a ‘true-cognitivist’ way: moral judgements are truth-evaluable and some of them are actually 
true (p. 98-99), the same way we talk about other things” (p. 129). In the same vein, I think Cohon’s comments on the anti-metaphysical 
interpretation of Humphrey Morris and Charlotte Brown – Hume is neither realist nor anti-realist – are also congenial to my view: in spite 
of the issue realism-anti-realism, Hume “thinks we grasp moral good and evil by the process of feeling certain sentiments” (p. 120). I 
would just add: it does not concern, in the first place, epistemology.
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Kail says that the role of pleasure and pain is that of 
presenting “ultimate ends” that cannot be explained by rea-
son, but which experience constitutes as such for us (cf. 2007, 
p. 188-189). In this regard, the argument has to be based on 
“a normative view of the role of pleasure and pain”, they are 
going to be seen as desirable or aversion-worthy on their own 
sake. The only alternative would be to see Hume’s argument 
as being a defense of psychological hedonism. This hedonism 
would aim to explain all desire as oriented towards pleasure, 
our own pleasure, which would amount to the “philosophical 
chemistry” that Hume criticizes in the doctrine of self-love in 
the second Appendix of the second Enquiry. The argument 
rather concerns what has essential value, and so far can ex-
plain desires and aversions. Hume states: “Taste, as it gives 
pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, 
becomes a motive to a ion, and is the first spring or impulse 
to desire and volition” (Hume, 1975, p. 294, my emphasis)11.
As to the point of there not being a reason for our af-
fection towards pleasure and for our aversion towards pain, 
it seems to me that this view also helps to explain Hume’s 
shocking anti-Hutchesonian thesis presented in his three fa-
mous examples (Cf. McIntyre, 2009).
It is not contrary to reason to prefer the de-
struction of the whole world to the scratch-
ing of my finger. It is not contrary to reason 
for me to choose my total ruin, to prevent 
the least uneasiness of an Indian, or person 
wholly unknown to me. It is as little contrary 
to reason to prefer even my own acknowl-
edged lesser good to my greater, and have 
a more ardent affection for the former than 
the latter (Hume, 1978, p. 416).
It is clear that Hume’s purpose is not to endorse the 
preferences we would intuitively judge to be unjustified, but 
rather to register that (1) there is something ultimate con-
cerning our hedonic experiences that is not accountable by 
reason, and (2) they are – in ordinary parlance – “irrational” 
because of a reflection conducted by “calm passions” and not 
by a reasoning process conducted  by reason12. Hume writes:
Men often counteract a violent passion in 
prosecution of their interests and designs; 
it is not, therefore, the present uneasiness 
alone which determines them. In general 
we may observe that both these principles 
operate on the will; and where they are con-
trary, that either of them prevails, according 
to the general character or present dispo-
sition of the person. What we call strength 
of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm 
passions above the violent; though we may 
easily observe, there is no man so constant-
ly possessed of this virtue as never on any 
occasion to yield to the solicitations of pas-
sion and desire (Hume, 1978, p. 418).
But if this is so, then we will not find in Hume what Si-
mon Blackburn has dubbed a “monotonous hedonism” (“fit 
only for pigs”)13, or also a monolithic hedonism. The satisfa ion 
or pleasure with the moral sentiment which approves including 
strength of mind in us can present a form of pleasure that can 
win over promises of violent pleasure in the present and in the 
future. But this implies that there are qualities of pleasures, and 
therefore that the sheer quantity of pleasure is not the only crite-
rium for our decisions which amount to “determinations of the 
will”, according to Hume’s point of view. Against the Kantian 
challenge, Hume does not accept – holding instead a metaphys-
ical hedonism, a “material” position for sure – the inevitability of 
hedonism of choice as Kant understood it14.
It seems to me that this position is part of an Aufklärung’s 
project, but of a rather Scottish type, which accomplishes the 
11 Apropos of this argument, Baier concentrates on the relations between the agreeable and the useful. However, her main claim is that 
“such intrinsically valued things are what Hume terms ‘directly agreeable’, as contrasted with the indirectly agreeable, the ‘useful’”. As 
“the useful is the indirectly agreeable, the expected means to the directly agreeable [,] this seems to make the agreeable the more basic 
category, ‘agreeable’ the name for the more ultimate good” (2009, p. 252, my emphasis).
12 Cf. McIntyre (2009, p. 81): “What they [cases as the third of Hume’s examples] share is a lack of reflectiveness. The three cases [the 
ones presented by Hume] together show that calm reflectiveness, and in particular, our ability to use one desire to limit and regulate 
another, is an activity directed by our calm passions and not by reason. Reflectiveness about the consequences of acting on a propensity 
or passion involves the use of reason, but reflectiveness needs to be motivated by passion too, just as actions do”.
13 Blackburn (2001, Part Two, Section 11, p. 82). Blackburn criticizes Mill’s somewhat Victorian view that introduces the different dimen-
sions of “quality” of pleasures: “This betrays Bentham by introducing some other source of value than the pleasure itself”. In spite of 
this, “Mill’s main point remains, though, that anybody concentrating upon happiness or pleasure can remember the indefinite variety of 
things in which human beings take pleasure, or the indefinite variety of things they enjoy” (p. 82). A rather Humean point!
14 Cf. Schneewind (1998, p. 524) for the place, differently occupied, where a common road leads to: “For Hutcheson and Hume, approval by 
the moral faculty makes certain motives virtues; and it is quite possible that Kant read Shaftesbury as saying no more than that moral good-
ness, on that view, is not discovered by the moral faculty but constituted by it. The moral sense is then like the Pufendorfian divine will that 
creates moral entities. Although the world without the moral feelings would contain motives directed toward the benefit of others, it would 
contain no moral attributes. It is a neutral universe, and only our response to it makes it otherwise. If our approval is what makes some motive 
good, others bad, then we are not subject to error as we would be if we had to know an objective Order in God’s mind, or an objective degree 
of perfection. And if our own approval makes motives good, then, despite Hobbes, when ordinary people test the proposed motives by the 
law, they are not using some secondhand criterion of morality given them by an authority. We can all determine what is right because our own 
feelings make it right. Kant plainly agreed with this voluntarist aspect of sentimentalism although he rejected the sentimentalist account of 
approval. But the knowledge involved in Kantian morality as autonomy is knowledge of the self’s own way of thinking”.
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prizing of our sensibility in the form of a ta e that affords us 
genuine pleasures and pains. In Baier’s dictum: “for morality, to 
him, is a matter of taste in chara er traits” (Cf. 1991, p. 250). 
Pleasure and pain may, therefore, be seen by Kantians in too 
limited a fashion, even when they admit they should not be 
altogether avoided and must rather be structured morally, that 
is, put in the framework of morality, which nonetheless may 
seem to Humeans to be framing them inexcusably moralis-
tically15.
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